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At the heart of Global Capitalism, Global War, Global Crisis is a revolt against fetishism: 
the appeal to abstract categories, treating concepts as if they referred to things ‘out there’ 
in the world, independent of social relations). It is commonplace to note that studies of 
international relations routinely fetishise a system of ‘sovereign’ states, abstracted from 
history and the social relations, practices and ideologies that sustain state power. What 
Bieler and Morton emphasise is that even ‘Left’ analyses routinely make fetishistic appeal 
to concepts – ‘the state’, ‘the market’, ‘security’, ‘production’, ‘finance’, ‘knowledge’ – 
which are treated as things-in-themselves, devoid of human beings in their concrete social 
relations.1 Despite some scholars’ careless applications of the label ‘Marxist’ to such 
work, Bieler and Morton’s critique is very much in line with Marx’s own critique of a 
tradition of classical political economy so beholden to the modern obsession with uni-
formity and universality that it forcibly read history through the categories of bourgeois 
ideology (abstract individuals interacting in ‘the market’ and so on) that were made to 
look like ‘general preconditions of all production’.2 For the authors of Global Capitalism, 
Global War, Global Crisis, these concerns take on particular urgency at a juncture marked 
by global economic ‘crisis’, the developmental ‘catch-up’ of emerging economies and 
inter-state rivalry shaped by the dynamics of global political economy.3 The last thing we 
need is more fetishism, more mindless repetition of abstract categories like ‘states’, ‘mar-
kets’, ‘security’ and so on. All this does is naturalise the existing order and insulate it from 
critique. Instead, Bieler and Morton insist, we must confront the historical contingency of 
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capitalism and ‘be on guard against the use of fetishised concepts, categories or raw 
facts’.4 This is, in other words, a ‘necessarily historical materialist moment’.5
Global Capitalism, Global War, Global Crisis is, in many regards, a magisterial dem-
onstration of why, in concrete, real world terms, it matters that we attend both to the 
historically contingent nature of our categories of thought (or, in a different lexicon, the 
discursive constitution of the world) and to the capitalist social relations from which 
dominant ideas emerge and to which those ideas give form. In these brief remarks, I do 
not intend to focus upon the substance of their empirical analysis, but to offer some 
reflections upon the philosophical underpinnings of this endeavour (and, I should add, its 
political implications). Bieler and Morton aim to steer a path between an economistic 
faux-Marxism that treats ideas as epiphenomena of material structures, on the one hand, 
and an overemphasis on contingency, on the other.6 Historical materialism does not reject 
the poststructuralist claim that objects are constituted through discourse. Where it dif-
fers, Bieler and Morton underscore, is in the assertion that this is ‘material social practice 
(. . .) developed through means of social production and reproduction as a material 
relation’.7 In other words, we cannot ignore capitalism and the material reality that some 
people own capital and others have to sell their labour power to survive, but this does not 
mean that these social relations – or the structures to which they give rise – exist as things 
in themselves.8 Rather, Bieler and Morton emphasise the relational nature of ontology: 
all categories, they argue, are internally related to one another, part of a self-forming 
whole.9 Class emerges from historical relations and struggle, in intimate entanglements 
with race, gender and our relationship to the natural world. Thus, race, gender, ecology 
and sexuality are internally constitutive of class, held together with class in a ‘combative 
unity’, and struggles over these forms of domination must not be subordinated to nar-
rowly-defined ‘class’ struggle.10
I should emphasise at the start that I agree with much about Bieler and Morton’s 
approach. I agree that it is important to locate struggles against racism, patriarchal domi-
nation and depredations against nature in relation to global capitalism, without reading 
them off a fixed account of economic relations. I also concur with their critique of much 
Foucauldian thought, in which contingency is so absolute that there can never be ‘a 
moment of ontological fullness’, that would enable us to identify the stakes of critique, 
or understand why ‘a certain set of ideas (. . .) dominates at a particular time’.11 Indeed, 
as Doerthe Rosenow and I have discussed, what we often find in post-structuralist 
thought – as well as in Foucault’s work itself – is that tacit ontological assumptions slip 
back in (because we cannot do without them if we want to talk about political stakes).12 
In IR scholarship, this often involves – albeit entirely contrary to the intentions of 
Foucauldian scholars – fetishising categories of policy discourse based on decidedly 
liberal ontological assumptions, generating what we identify as the ‘security fetish’ of 
much poststructuralist IR.13
Where my disquiet begins is at the point at which Bieler and Morton specify their own 
ontological starting point: the underlying power structure given form by the social rela-
tions of production, characterised in terms of two classes opposing one another.14 It is 
important to underscore that with their anti-essentialist view of class, Bieler and Morton 
recognise that racism and gender relations take on particular connotations in the context 
of capitalism, that the history of class formation is also a history of colonialism, 
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patriarchal domination and appropriation of nature, and that we need to think about 
‘expanded forms of class struggle’ that recognise the internal relationships between 
class, gender, race and the natural world.15 However, the implications of this formula-
tion, which draws upon a well-known article by David McNally, become clear in a sub-
sequent chapter on ‘Exploitation and Resistance’.16 For Bieler and Morton, as for 
McNally, gender and race are ‘identities’ that are inherent to class as it ‘happens’ within 
human relationships.17 My concern is that this downplays the significance of racialisa-
tion and hetero-patriarchal domination as constitutive of capitalism, not only historically 
but as, in Silvia Federici’s words, ‘necessary conditions for the existence of capitalism of 
all times’.18
Capitalism has been extended through and alongside specific Eurocentric and anthro-
pocentric forms of knowledge, with more fundamental implications for language and 
lived experience in the present than I think Bieler and Morton acknowledge. For instance, 
as Gurminder Bhambra and John Holmwood emphasise, the very category of ‘labour’ in 
political-economic thought rests upon a racialised moral economy through which the 
‘free’ worker (whose labour power is commodified) is differentiated from the slave 
(commodified in their very being).19 Likewise, ‘to look at history from a feminist view-
point’, Federici insists, also ‘means to redefine in fundamental ways the accepted histori-
cal categories’ that have come to shape political economy.20 As Rosenow underscores in 
her work on environmental activism, it is commonplace that critical scholars to simulta-
neously acknowledge that ‘non-Western ways of making sense of nature have been 
ignored and suppressed in political and socioeconomic practice’ and ‘neglect the way 
that Marxist, anarchist, deconstructivist or otherwise radical Eurocentric concepts and 
categories continue to suppress alternative bodies of knowledge about the world’.21
This tendency is reflected in Bieler and Morton’s ontological starting point and their 
subsequent framing of expanded class struggle. They recognise that capitalism has been 
coeval with the suppression of other knowledges, particularly with regard to the natural 
world. What they miss is that the shaping of language and lived experience through the 
extension of Western capitalism (in other words, what decolonial thinkers call colonial-
ity) is as much as much an ontological phenomenon as an epistemological one.22 Nelson 
Maldonado-Torres has reflected at length on how ontological thinking feeds invisibili-
sation and dehumanisation of racialised subjects when taken as a foundation.23 This has 
important implications for how, and in the company of whom, we approach questions 
of capitalism, war and crisis, and how we conceptualise anticapitalist struggle. Take the 
question of capitalist-driven ecological crisis and how this might be approached through 
the suppressed knowledges of colonised peoples. For indigenous peoples of the 
Americas, for instance, the land is a living being, to be respected and protected. Land 
itself is a Mother, not a thing to be appropriated as a commodity or defended as mere 
property. It is, as Rolando Vázquez explains, to be defended as part of life, ‘for the sake 
of protecting the ancestors, of preserving an origin that is both past and always, already 
present’.24 The land does not exist in a linear temporality, to be subjected to forces of 
progress and development. In its very being ‘it implies the past, heritage, memory’.25 
These are not, in other words, just distinct interpretations or discourses that attribute 
value to nature differently. They are ontologically incompatible with a modern Western 
relationship to nature.
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The metaphor I normally use to make sense of this ontological incompatibility for 
Western audiences is that of wave-particle duality in physics. If we want to understand 
the diffraction of light into the colours of a rainbow, then we need to conceptualise pho-
tons as waves.26 If we want to understand how a photovoltaic cell works, then we must 
conceptualise photons as particles. Neither conceptualisation is compatible with the 
other, yet neither is more correct. Rather, what the photon is depends upon our interac-
tion with light in the context of an experiment, what we do with the light and by what 
means, our relationship with it – and with other objects (the prism, the photovoltaic 
material and so on).27
A Marxist might respond that this is missing the point: that the social relations of 
production provide us with an appropriate general category to underpin analysis of 
international relations and, as such, an appropriate ontological starting point.28 Consider 
Marx’s critique of the fetishisms of classical political economy, introduced above. Marx 
was scathing towards a modern mode of reason so ‘ruled by abstractions’ that it engen-
dered a forced reading of history through categories that were themselves historical 
products of capitalist ideology. He was, nevertheless, insistent that this did not mean 
that we can only undertake descriptive analyses of specific historical phenomena (pre-
cisely the problem that Bieler and Morton correctly identify with Foucault). What was 
important for Marx was how historically particular categories were combined with gen-
eral, transhistorical categories. ‘Production’, he considered an appropriate general cat-
egory, because it identified certain common features of all societies’ forms of social 
reproduction. There is a ‘general uniformity’ to production, which is to say the ‘appro-
priation of nature by the individual within and through a definite form of society’.29 
This ‘general uniformity’, whatever the form of society within which production takes 
place, ‘is due to the fact that the subject, mankind, and the object, nature, remain the 
same’.30 As such, the concept of production could be brought to bear on that which was 
specific to capitalism.31 Production, moreover, is always one part within a closed total-
ity of social reproduction: ‘production, distribution, exchange and consumption (. . .) 
are all members of one entity, different aspects of one unit’ (in other words, an ontology 
grounded in production is one of internal relations).32
What if, however, the subject and object do not remain the same? What cannot be 
captured here are those other ways of being human, and the other modes of relationship 
with the non-human and other temporalities these imply. It is not at all clear that relation-
ships with nature in indigenous cosmovisions can be captured by the term ‘production’ 
at all. The ontological incompatibility at play is not transhistorical but intrahistorical. 
Think, again, of wave-particle duality: the very being of the world is not only relational 
and emergent from interaction but simultaneously plural and inconsistent (wave and par-
ticle, in this case). We can accept – with Marx – the transhistorical relevance of certain 
categories such as production. We can also accept the relational nature of ontology: that 
categories are internally related to one another. But there is a danger of further obscuring 
other, ontologically incompatible, concepts and fields of relations by reading one, inter-
nally related, emergent constellation as a unified totality. Within Bieler and Morton’s 
framework of internal relations, decolonial and anticapitalist indigenous struggles over 
land and nature can only feature as ‘idioms’ within the dynamics of expanded class 
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struggle, as part of a dialectical configuration or dynamic totality.33 They cannot be 
grasped, ontologically speaking, on their own terms.
Much of the problem here is the tendency to think of history in terms of a totality, 
even when this is expressed in dialectal terms as ‘a dynamic totality that expresses (rather 
than suppresses) its discrete parts’.34 Rejecting this does not mean doing away with the 
idea of totality altogether, or dissolving everything into the fleeting and particular. 
‘Cultures outside “the West”’, Anibal Quijano observed, ‘routinely assume a perspective 
of totality in knowledge that acknowledges the irreducible, contradictory and heteroge-
neous nature of reality’.35 At stake here are not just multiple perspectives on a dynamic 
reality (within which indigenous cosmovisions would be just discourses or idioms), but 
plural – and incoherent – realities that are themselves always in the making through 
interaction with the world.36 This does not entail that there is ‘no truth’ about social and 
political reality (any more than the making of light into wave or particle or particle in the 
context of scientific experiments would imply that there is no truth about photons – we 
can, after all, make things with them). Nor does it mean going in the other direction, 
reifying other ontologies or assuming the emancipatory potential of radical alterity. It is 
vital, as anthropologists Lucas Bessire and David Bond insist in a critique of the so-
called ontological turn in social science, not to eschew the task of grasping power and 
domination ‘by the root’ in favour of ‘tend[ing] to a different plant altogether’.37
My own approach to engaging with dissonant ontologies is of many years of involve-
ment with indigenous, peasant and worker movements in Colombia, where contradictory 
ontologies are enacted within struggles rooted in embodied experience of the violences 
of capitalism, war and perpetual crisis.38 Here, Marxism, feminism and indigenous cos-
movisions collide, not as idioms within one expanded class struggle or ‘combined oppo-
sitional consciousness’,39 but as what Rosenow and I call ‘echoing’ reference points.40 
Peasant activists talk about visions for life forged from a ‘convergence in space-time’ 
with indigenous populations. Trade unionists grounded in Marxist theory, meanwhile, 
build relations of solidarity with indigenous movements on terms that engage recipro-
cally – and seek to learn from – ontological dissonance.41 There is not space here to set 
out what this means for how we understand theory or philosophical foundations to analy-
sis, except to say that it involves thinking theory through the lens of concepts and rela-
tions formed in struggle, rather than situating struggle in relation to theory.42 It also 
involves an emphasis upon relationship and reciprocity, and, as Maldonado Torres puts 
in closing his essay ‘On the Coloniality of Being’, an invitation ‘to think modernity/
coloniality critically from different epistemic positions and according to the manifold 
experiences of subjects who suffer different dimensions of the coloniality of Being (. . .) 
to initiate a dialogue between humans and those considered subhumans – and the formu-
lation of a decolonial and critical cosmopolitanism’.43
It may indeed be a ‘necessarily historical materialist moment’: Bieler and Morton set 
out compellingly why this is the case, and why it matters that we avoid the violent 
abstractions that naturalise the existing order. Nevertheless, while perhaps necessary, 
historical materialism is certainly not sufficient.
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